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Abstract
We consider the decentralized power allocation and spectrum sharing problem in multi-user, multi-
channel systems with strategic users. We present a mechanism/game form that has the following desirable
features. (1) It is individually rational. (2) It is budget balanced at every Nash equilibrium of the game
induced by the game form as well as off equilibrium. (3) The allocation corresponding to every Nash
equilibrium (NE) of the game induced by the mechanism is a Lindahl allocation, that is, a weakly Pareto
optimal allocation. Our proposed game form/mechanism achieves all the above desirable properties
without any assumption about, concavity, differentiability, monotonicity, or quasi-linearity of the users’
utility functions.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation and Challenges
As wireless communication devices become more pervasive, the demand for the frequency
spectrum that serves as the underlying medium grows. Recently, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) has established rules (see [1]) that describes how cognitive radios can lead
to more efficient use of the frequency spectrum. These rules along with the cognitive radio’s
features and the fact that information in the wireless network is decentralized and users may
be strategic give rise to a wealth of important and challenging research issues associated with
power allocation and spectrum sharing. These issues have recently attracted a lot of interest (e.g.
October 17, 2018 DRAFT
[2], [6], [9] and [15]; a more detailed discussion of the references and their comparison with
the results of this paper will be presented in section VI).
In this paper we investigate a power allocation and spectrum sharing problem arising in
multi-user, multi-channel systems with decentralized information and strategic/selfish users. We
formulate the problem as a public good ([14] Ch. 12) allocation with strategic users. We propose
an approach based on the philosophy of mechanism design, in particular, implementation theory
([14] Ch. 15). We present a game form /mechanism ([14] Ch. 15.2.3) and analyze its properties.
We compare our results with those already available in the literature.
B. Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II we present our model, describe
the assumptions on the model’s information structure and state our objective. In section III we
describe the allocation game form/mechanism we propose for the solution of our problem. In
section IV we interpret the components of the proposed game form/mechanism. In section V
we investigate the properties of the proposed game form. In section VI we compare the results
of this paper with those of the existing literature. We conclude in section VII.
II. THE MODEL AND OBJECTIVE
A. The Model
We consider N users/agents communicating over f frequency bands. Let N := {1, · · · , N}
be the set of users, and F := {1, 2, · · · , f} the set of frequency bands. Each user i, i ∈ N, is
a communicating pair consisting of one transmitter and one receiver. There is one additional
agent, the (N + 1)th agent, who is different from all the other N agents/users and whose role
will be described below. Each user has a fixed total power W¯ which he can allocate over the
set F of frequency bands. Let pji , i ∈ N, j ∈ F denote the power user i allocates to frequency
band j. The power pji , i ∈ N, j ∈ F must be chosen from the set Q := {0, Q1, Q2, · · · , Ql}
where Qk > 0, 1 ≤ k ≤ l and 0 means that user i does not use frequency band j ∈ F to
communicate information. In other words, Q is a set of quantization levels that a user can use
when he allocates power in a certain frequency band. Let p¯i = (p1i , p2i , · · · , p
f
i ), i ∈ N, denote a
feasible bundle of power user i allocates over the frequency bands in F. That is, pji ∈ Q, ∀j ∈ F,
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and
∑
j∈F p
j
i ≤ W¯ . Let P = (p¯1, p¯2, · · · , p¯N) be a profile of feasible bundles of powers allocated
by the N users over the frequency bands in F; let Π denote the set of all feasible profiles P.
Since the sets, N,F and Q are finite, Π is finite. Let |Π| = GN ; we represent every feasible
power profile by a number between 1 and GN . Thus, Π = {1, 2, · · · , GN}. If user i allocates
positive power in frequency band j, it may experience interference from those users who also
allocate positive power in that frequency band. The intensity of the interference experienced by
user i, i ∈ N, depends on the power profiles used by the other users and the ‘channel gains’ hji
between the other users j, j 6= i, and i. The satisfaction that user i, i ∈ N, obtains during the
communication process depends on his transmission power and the intensity of the interference
he experiences. Consequently, user i’s, i ∈ N, satisfaction depends on the whole feasible bundle
k, k ∈ Π, of power and is described by his utility function Vi(k, ti), i ∈ N, where ti ∈ R
represents the tax (subsidy) user i pays (receives) for communicating. One example of such a
utility function is presented in the discussion following the assumptions. All taxes are paid to
the (N + 1)th agent who is not a profit maker; this agent acts like an accountant, collects the
money from all users who pay taxes and redistributes it to all users who receive subsidies.
We now state our assumptions about the model, the users’ utility functions, and the nature of
the problem we investigate. Some of these assumptions are restrictions we impose, some others
are a consequence of the nature of the problem we investigate. We comment on each of the
assumptions we make after we state them.
(A1): We consider a static power allocation and spectrum sharing problem.
(A2): Each agent/user is aware of all the other users present in the system. Users talk to each
other and exchange messages in a broadcast setting. That is, each user hears every other user’s
message; the (N + 1)th agent hears all the other users’ messages. After the message exchange
process ends/converges, decision about power allocations at various frequency bands are made.
(A3): Each user’s transmission at a particular frequency band creates interference to every user
transmitting in the same frequency band.
(A4): The channel gains hji(fˆ), j, i ∈ N, fˆ ∈ F are known to user i, i ∈ N. The gains hji(fˆ),
j, i ∈ N, fˆ ∈ F, do not change during the communication process.
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(A5): Each user’s utility Vi(x, ti), x ∈ Π ∪ {0}1, is decreasing in ti, ti ∈ R, i ∈ N. Furthermore,
Vi(x, ti) ≥ Vi(0, ti) for any ti ∈ R and x ∈ Π.
(A6): The utility function Vi, i ∈ N, is user i’s private information.
(A7): The quantization set Q is selected from Q; the parameter W¯ is selected from W , and Vi
is selected from V for all i, i ∈ N. Q,Q, W¯ ,W and V are common knowledge among all users.
(A8): Each user behaves strategically, that is, each user is selfish and attempts to maximize his
own utility function under the constraints on the total power available to him, and the set Q of
quantization levels.
(A9): The representation/association of every feasible power profile by a number in the set Π is
common knowledge among all users.
We now briefly discuss each of the above assumptions. We restrict attention to the static power
allocation and spectrum sharing problem ((A1)). The dynamic problem is a major open problem
that we intend to address in the future. We assume that all users are in a relatively small area, so
they can hear each other, are aware of the presence of one another, interfere with one another and
exchange messages in a broadcast setting ((A2),(A3)). Since each user’s satisfaction depends on
his transmission power and the interference he experiences, his utility will depend on the whole
power profile x ∈ Π; furthermore, the higher the tax a user pays, the lower is his satisfaction;
moreover any feasible power allocation x, (i.e. x ∈ Π) is preferred to any non-feasible power
allocation denoted by 0. All these considerations justify ((A5)). An example of Vi(x, ti) is
Ui
(
hii(1)p
1
i
N0
2
+
∑
j,j 6=i hji(1)p
1
j
, · · · ,
hii(f)p
f
i
N0
2
+
∑
j,j 6=i hji(f)p
f
j
)
− ti, (1)
where hii(k)p
k
i
N0
2
+
∑
j,j 6=i hji(k)p
k
j
is the Signal to Interference Ratio (SIR) in frequency band k. This
example illustrates the following: (1) A user’s utility function may explicitly depend on the
channel gains hji, j, i ∈ N; (2) User i, i ∈ N, must know hji, j ∈ N, so that he can be able to
evaluate the impact of any feasible power profile x ∈ Π that he proposes on his own utility.
Thus, we assume that the channel gains hji, j ∈ N, are known to user i, and this is true for
every user i ((A4)). These channel gains have to be measured before the communication process
1 The number zero denotes every non-feasible allocation.
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starts. In the situation where users are cooperative hji can easily be determined; user j sends
a pilot signal of a fixed power to user i, user i measures the received power and determines
hji. When users are strategic/selfish, the measurement of hji can not be achieved according to
the process described above, because user j may have an incentive to use a pilot signal other
than the one agreed beforehand so that he can obtain an advantage over user i. In this situation
procedures similar to ones described in [2] (section V) can be used to measure hji; we present
a method, different from those proposed in [2], for measuring hji(fˆ), j, i ∈ N, fˆ ∈ F, after
we discuss all the assumptions. In ((A4)) we further assume that hji do not change during the
communication process. Such an assumption is reasonable when the mobile users move slowly
and the variation of the channel is considerably slower than the duration of the communication
process. Assumption ((A8)) is a behavioral one not a restriction on the model. Since according
to ((A8)) users are strategic, each user may not want to reveal his own preference over the
set of feasible power allocations, thus assumption ((A6)) is reasonable. It is also reasonable
to assume that the function space where each user’s utility comes from is the same for all
users and common knowledge among all users ((A7)). The fact that a user’s utility is his private
information along with assumption ((A8)) have an immediate impact on the solution/equilibrium
concepts that can be used in the game induced by any mechanism. We will address this issue
when we define the objective of our problem. Assumption ((A7)) also ensures that each user
uses the same quantization set. Furthermore, it states that each user knows the power available
to every other user. The solution methodology presented in this paper works also for the case
where every user knows his total available power, has an upper bound on the power available
to all other users, and this upper bound is common knowledge among all users. Assumption
((A9)) is necessary for the game form/mechanism proposed in this paper; it ensures that each
user interprets consistently the messages he receives from all other users.
In addition to the method described in [2], another method for determining the gains hji(fˆ),
j, i ∈ N, fˆ ∈ F is the following. We assume that the gain hij(fˆ) from the transmitter of pair
i to the receiver of pair j is the same as h¯ji(fˆ), the gain from the receiver of pair j to the
transmitter of pair i for all i, j ∈ N and fˆ ∈ F. Before the power allocation and spectrum
sharing process starts, the (N + 1)th agent asks transmitter i and receiver j to communicate
with one another at frequency fˆ by using a fixed power p¯, and to report to him their received
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powers. This communication process takes place as follows: First transmitter i sends a message
with power p¯ at frequency fˆ to receiver j; then receiver j sends a message with power p¯ at
frequency fˆ to transmitter i; finally transmitter i and receiver j report their received power to
the (N + 1)th agent. This process is sequentially repeated between transmitter i and receiver
j for all frequencies fˆ ∈ F. After transmitter i and receiver j complete the above-described
communication process, the same process is repeated sequentially for all transmitter-receiver
pairs (k, l), k, l ∈ N, at all frequencies fˆ ∈ F. The (N + 1)th agents collects all the reports
generated by the process described above. If the reports of any transmitter i and receiver j
(i 6= j, i, j ∈ N) differ at any frequency fˆ ∈ F, then user i and user j are not allowed to
participate in the power allocation and spectrum sharing process.
The above-described method for determining hji(fˆ), i, j ∈ N, fˆ ∈ F, provides an incentive to
user i, i ∈ N, to follow/obey its rules if user i does better by participating in the power allocation
and spectrum sharing process than by not participating in it. Consequently, the method proposed
for determining hji(fˆ), i, j ∈ N, fˆ ∈ F, will work if the game form we propose is individually
rational. In this paper we prove that individual rationality is one of the properties of the proposed
game form.
B. Objective
The objective is to determine a game form/mechanism that has the following features,
• (P1) For any realization (V1, V2, · · · , VN ,Q, W¯ ) ∈ VN ×Q×W all Nash equilibria of the
game induced by the game form/mechanism result in allocations that are weakly Pareto
optimal ([14] pg. 265).
• (P2) For every realization (V1, V2, · · · , VN ,Q, W¯ ) ∈ VN × Q × W the users voluntarily
participate in the game induced by the game form/mechanism, i.e, the mechanism is indi-
vidually rational.
• (P3) For every realization (V1, V2, · · · , VN ,Q, W¯ ) ∈ VN ×Q×W ,
∑
i∈N ti(m) = 0, where
m is any outcome of the game induced by the game form. That is, for any outcome m of
the game we have a balanced budget.
We follow the philosophy of implementation theory ([14] Ch. 15) for the specification of our
game form. We refer the reader to [8] for a description of the key ideas of implementation theory
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and their use in the context of communication networks. In the next section we present a game
form/mechanism that achieves the above objectives. However, before we proceed we present
a brief clarification on the interpretation of Nash equilibria. Nash equiliria describe strategic
behavior in games of complete information. Since in our model the users’ utilities are their
private information, the resulting game is not one of complete information. We can have a game
of complete infromation by increasing the message/strategy space following Maskin’s approach
[10]. However, such an approach would result in an infinite dimensional message/strategy space
for the corresponding game. We don’t follow Maskin’s approach; instead we adopt the philosophy
of [5], [8], [12], [13]. Specifically, by quoting [12],
”we interpret our analysis as applying to an unspecified (message exchange) process
in which users grope their way to a stationary message and in which the Nash property
is a necessary condition for stationarity”.
III. A MECHANISM FOR POWER ALLOCATION AND SPECTRUM SHARING
For the decentralized problem formulated in section II we propose a game form/mechanism
the components of which are described as follows.
Message space M := M1 × M2 × · · ·MN : The message/strategy space for user i, i =
1, 2, · · · , N, is given by Mi ⊆ Z×R+, where Z and R+ are the sets of integers and non-negative
real numbers, respectively. Specifically, a message of user i is of the form, mi = (ni, pii) where
ni ∈ Z and pii ∈ R+.
The meaning of the message space is the following. The component ni represents the power
profile proposed by user i; the component pii denotes the price per unit of power user i is willing
to pay per unit of the power profile ni. The message ni belongs to an extended set Z of power
profiles. Every element/integer in Z − Π corresponds to a power profile that is non-feasible.
Working with such an extended set of power profiles does not alter the solution of the original
problem since, as we show in section V, all Nash equilibria of the game induced by the proposed
mechanism correspond to feasible power allocations.
Outcome function ~: The outcome function ~ is given by, ~ :M→ N× RN . and is defined
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as follows. For any m := (m1,m2, · · · ,mN) ∈ M,
~(m) = ~(m1,m2, · · · ,mN ) =
([
int
(∑N
i=1 ni
N
)]
, t1(m), · · · , tN(m)
)
.
where int
(∑N
i=1 ni
N
)
is the integer number closest to
(∑N
i=1 ni
N
)
and
[
int
(∑N
i=1 ni
N
)]
=

 int
(∑N
i=1 ni
N
)
, if int
(∑N
i=1 ni
N
)
∈ {1, 2, · · · , GN};
0, otherwise.
(2)
The component ti, i = 1, 2, · · · , N, describes the tax (subsidy) that user i pays (receives). The
tax(subsidy) for every user is defined as follows,
ti(m) =
{
int
(∑N
i=1 ni
N
)[
pii+1 − pii+2
N
]
+ (ni − ni+1)
2pii − (ni+1 − ni+2)
2pii+1
}
×1
{
int
(∑N
i=1 ni
N
)
∈ {1, 2, · · · , GN}
}
(3)
where 1{A} denotes the indicator function of event A, that is, 1{A} = 1 if A is true and
1{A} = 0 otherwise, and N + 1 and N + 2 are to be interpreted as 1 and 2, respectively.
IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE MECHANISM
As pointed out in section II, the design of an efficient resource allocation mechanism has to
achieve the following goals. (i) It must induce strategic users to voluntarily participate in the
allocation process. (ii) It must induce strategic users to follow its operational rules. (iii) It must
result in weakly Pareto optimal allocations at all equilibria of the induced game. (iv) It must
result in a balanced budget at all equilibria and off equilibrium.
To achieve these goals we propose the tax incentive function described by (3). This function
consists of three components, Ξ1,Ξ2 and Ξ3, that is,
ti(m) = int
(∑N
i=1 ni
N
)[
pii+1 − pii+2
N
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ξ1
+ (ni − ni+1)
2pii︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ξ2
−(ni+1 − ni+2)
2pii+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ξ3
(4)
The term Ξ1 specifies the amount that each user must pay for the power profile which is deter-
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mined by the mechanism. The price per unit of power, πi+1−πi+2
N
, paid by user i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
is not controlled by that user. The terms Ξ2 considered collectively provide an incentive to all
users to propose the same power profile. The term Ξ3 is not controlled by user i, its goal is to
lead to a balanced budget.
V. PROPERTIES OF THE MECHANISM
We prove the mechanism proposed in section III has the properties (P1), (P2) and (P3) stated
in subsection II-B by proceeding as follows. First, we derive a property of every NE of the game
induced by the mechanism proposed in section II, (Lemma 1); based on this result we determine
the form of the tax(subsidy) at all Nash equilibria. Then, we show that every NE of the game
induced by the mechanism proposed results in a feasible allocation, (Lemma 2). Afterward, we
prove that the proposed mechanism is always budget balanced, (Lemma 3). Subsequently we
show that users voluntarily participate2 in the game, by proving that the utility they receive at
all NE is greater than or equal to zero, which is the utility they receive by not participating in
the power allocation and spectrum sharing process, (Lemma 4). Finally, we show that every NE
of the game induced by the mechanism proposed in section III results in a Lindahl equilibrium
([14] Ch. 12.4.2); that is, every NE results in a weakly Pareto optimal allocation (Theorem 5).
Furthermore, we prove that every Lindahl equilibrium can be associated with a NE of the game
induced by the proposed mechanism in section III, (Theorem 6).
We now proceed to prove the above-stated properties.
Lemma 1: Let m∗ be a NE of the game induced by the proposed mechanism. Then for every
i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , we have
(n∗i − n
∗
i+1)
2pi∗i = 0. (5)
2In proving voluntary participation, we follow the philosophy presented by Fudenberg and Tirole ([3] p. 244-245), namely
that mechanism design is a three step game. In the first step the designer designs a mechanism, in the second step agents
simultaneously accept or reject the mechanism and in the third step agents who accept the mechanism play the game specified
by the mechanism. As a consequence of this philosophy non-participation is not a NE.
9
Proof: Since m∗ = ((n∗1, pi∗1), (n∗2, pi∗2), · · · , (n∗N , pi∗N )) is a NE, the following holds for every
i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
Vi
([
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)]
, ti(m
∗)
)
≥ Vi



int


∑N
k=1
k 6=i
n∗k + ni
N



 , ti(mi,m∗−i)


∀ mi ∈Mi, (6)
where m−i := (m1,m2, · · · ,mi−1,mi+1, · · · ,mN).
Set ni equal to n∗i ; then for every pii ≥ 0 Eq. (6) along with (3) imply
Vi
([
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)]
, ti(m
∗)
)
≥ Vi
([
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)]
, ti(mi,m
∗
−i)
)
(7)
where
ti(m
∗) =
{
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)[
pi∗i+1 − pi
∗
i+2
N
]
+ (n∗i − n
∗
i+1)
2pi∗i − (n
∗
i+1 − n
∗
i+2)
2pi∗i+1
}
×1
{
int
(∑N
i=1 n
∗
i
N
)
∈ {1, 2, · · · , GN}
}
(8)
ti((n
∗
i , pii),m
∗
−i) =
{
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)[
pi∗i+1 − pi
∗
i+2
N
]
+ (n∗i − n
∗
i+1)
2pii − (n
∗
i+1 − n
∗
i+2)
2pi∗i+1
}
×1
{
int
(∑N
i=1 n
∗
i
N
)
∈ {1, 2, · · · , GN}
}
(9)
Since Vi is decreasing in ti Eq. (7) along with (8) and (9) yield
pi∗i (n
∗
i − n
∗
i+1)
2 ≤ pii(n
∗
i − n
∗
i+1)
2 ∀ pii ≥ 0. (10)
Therefore, pi∗i (n∗i − n∗i+1)2 = 0 for every i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , at every NE m∗.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 1 is the following. At every NE m∗ of the mechanism
the tax function t(m∗) has the form
ti(m
∗) = 1
{
int
(∑N
i=1 n
∗
i
N
)
∈ {1, 2, · · · , GN}
}
× int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)[
pi∗i+1 − pi
∗
i+2
N
]
. (11)
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In the following lemma, we show that every NE of the game induced by the proposed mechanism
is feasible.
Lemma 2: Every NE of the game induced by the proposed mechanism results in a feasible
allocation.
Proof: We prove the assertion of the lemma by contradiction. Let m∗ be a NE for the
game induced by the mechanism. Suppose m∗ does not result in a feasible allocation, i.e.,
int
(∑N
i=1 n
∗
i
N
)
/∈ {1, 2, 3, · · · , GN}. Then
[
int
(∑N
j=1 n
∗
j
N
)]
= 0. Since
∑N
j=1(pi
∗
j+1−pi
∗
j+2) = 0,
there exists i, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, such that
pi∗i+1 − pi
∗
i+2 ≤ 0. (12)
Keep m∗−i fixed and define mi = (ni, pii) as follows; set pii = 0, and choose ni such that
int
(∑N
j=1,j 6=i n
∗
j+ni
N
)
∈ {1, 2, · · · , GN}. Now, (3) yield that
ti(mi,m
∗
−i) ≤ 0. (13)
Equations (12) and (13) along with Lemma 1 and assumption (A5) result in
Vi(0, 0) = Vi
([
int
(∑N
j=1 n
∗
j
N
)]
, ti(m
∗)
)
< Vi
([
int
(∑N
j=1,j 6=i n
∗
j + ni
N
)]
, ti(mi,m
∗
−i)
)
.(14)
But (14) is in contradiction with the fact that m∗ is a NE. Therefore, every NE of the game
induced by the proposed mechanism results in a feasible allocation.
In the following lemma, we show that the proposed mechanism is always budget balanced.
Lemma 3: The proposed mechanism is always budget balanced.
Proof: To have a balanced budget it is necessary and sufficient to satisfy ∑Ni=1 ti(mi) = 0.
It is easy to see that it always holds since from (3) we have
N∑
i=1
ti(m) =
N∑
i=1
{
int
(∑N
i=1 ni
N
)[
pii+1 − pii+2
N
]
+ (ni − ni+1)
2pii − (ni+1 − ni+2)
2pii+1
}
= 0. (15)
Equality (15) holds, since∑Ni=1(pii+1−pii+2) =∑Ni=1 ((ni − ni+1)2pii − (ni+1 − ni+2)2pii+1) = 0.
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The next result asserts that the mechanism/game form proposed in section III is individually
rational.
Lemma 4: The game form specified in section III is individually rational, i.e., at every NE m∗
the corresponding allocation
(
int
(∑N
i=1 n
∗
i
N
)
, t1(m
∗), t2(m
∗), · · · , tN(m
∗)
)
is weakly preferred
by all users to their initial endowment (0, 0).
Proof: We need to show that Vi
(
int
(∑N
i=1 n
∗
i
N
)
, ti(m
∗)
)
≥ Vi(0, 0) = 0 for every i, i =
1, 2, · · · , N. By the property of every NE it follows that for every i ∈ N and (ni, pii) ∈Mi
Vi
(
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)
, ti(m
∗)
)
≥ Vi



int


∑N
k=1
k 6=i
n∗k + ni
N



 , ti((ni, pii),m∗−i)

 . (16)
Choosing ni sufficiently large so that int

∑Nk=1k 6=i n∗k+ni
N

 /∈ {1, 2, · · · , GN}, gives

int


∑N
k=1
k 6=i
n∗k + nˆi
N



 = 0, (17)
because of (2), and
ti((ni, pii),m
∗
−i) = 0. (18)
because of (3). Consequently, (17) and (18) establish that
Vi
(
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)
, ti(m
∗)
)
≥ Vi(0, 0) = 0. (19)
In the following theorem, we show that every NE of the game induced by the mechanism
proposed in section III results in a Lindahl equilibrium.
Theorem 5: Suppose that an allocation Ψm, for any m ∈M, is determined as follows
Ψm := (Λ(m), t1(m), · · · , tN(m), L1, · · · , LN )
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where Λ(m) :=
[
int
(∑N
k=1 nk
N
)]
, for each i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N, ti(m) is defined by (3), and
Li :=
pii+1 − pii+2
N
. (20)
Then Ψm∗ is a Lindahl equilibrium corresponding to the NE
m∗ = ((n∗1, pi
∗
1), (n
∗
2, pi
∗
2), · · · , (n
∗
N , pi
∗
N ))
of the game induced by the proposed mechanism.
Proof: Ψm∗ defines a Lindahl equilibrium if it satisfies the following three conditions ([14]
Ch. 12.4.2)
1) (C1): ∑Ni=1 L∗i = 0.
2) (C2): ∑Ni=1 ti(m∗) = 0.
3) (C3): For all i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
(
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)
, ti(m
∗)
)
is a solution of the following
optimization problem:
maxx,ti Vi(x, ti)
subject to x L∗i = ti
x ∈ Π, ti ≥ 0. (21)
By simple algebra we can show that conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. We need to prove that
condition 3 is also satisfied. We do this by contradiction. Suppose
(
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)
, ti(m
∗)
)
is not a solution of the optimization problem defined by (21) for all i. Then, for some user
i, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, there is a power profile ζ ∈ Π and ζ 6= int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)
such that
Vi
(
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)
,
[
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)]
L∗i
)
< Vi(ζ, ζ L
∗
i ). (22)
Now choose p¯ii = 0 and n¯i = int
(
Nζ −
∑N
j=1
j 6=i
n∗j
)
. Using Eq. (3) and (5) together with the
fact that p¯ii = 0 we obtain
ti((n¯i, p¯ii),m
∗
−i) = ζ
[
pi∗i+1 − pi
∗
i+2
N
]
= ζ L∗i . (23)
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Then, because of (22) and (23) we get
Vi(ζ, ζ L
∗
i ) = Vi



int


∑N
j=1
j 6=i
n∗j+n¯i
N



 , ti((n¯i, p¯ii),m∗−i)

 ≥ Vi



int


∑N
j=1
j 6=i
n∗j+n
∗
i
N



 , ti(m∗)


which is a contradiction, because
m∗ = ((n∗1, pi
∗
1), (n
∗
2, pi
∗
2), · · · , (n
∗
N , pi
∗
N ))
is a NE of the game induced by the proposed game form. Consequently,
(
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)
, ti(m
∗)
)
is a solution of the optimization problem defined by (21) for all i. Since Ψm∗ satisfies (C1)-(C3)
it defines a Lindahl equilibrium. The allocation
{
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)
, t1(m
∗), t2(m
∗), · · · , tN(m
∗)
}
is also weakly Pareto optimal ([14] Theorem (12.4.1)).
Finally, we establish that any Lindahl equilibrium can be associated with a NE of the game
induced by the proposed mechanism.
Theorem 6: Let
Ψ =
(
Λℓ, tℓ1, t
ℓ
2, · · · , t
ℓ
N , L
ℓ
1, L
ℓ
2, · · · , L
ℓ
N
)
be a Lindahl equilibrium. Then, there does exist a NE m∗ of the game induced by the proposed
mechanism so that
~(m∗) =
(
Λℓ, tℓ1, t
ℓ
2, · · · , t
ℓ
N
) (24)
where for every i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , ti(m∗) = Λℓ Lℓi .
Proof: Consider the message profile m∗ such that for every i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , m∗i = (n∗i , pi∗i )
and, ∀i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , n∗i = (Λℓ) and pi∗i ’s are the solution of the following system of equations,
Lℓ1 =
pi∗2 − pi
∗
3
N
, Lℓ2 =
pi∗3 − pi
∗
4
N
, · · · , LℓN =
pi∗1 − pi
∗
2
N
. (25)
Choosing pi∗1 sufficiently large guarantees that the following is a feasible solution to (25), i.e.,
pii ≥ 0, ∀ i, pi
∗
1 = sufficiently large, pi∗2 = pi∗1 − LℓN and
pi∗i = (i− 1)pi
∗
1 −
(
LℓN +
i−2∑
j=1
Lℓj
)
i, 3 ≤ i ≤ N.
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Furthermore,
Λℓ =
[
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)]
. (26)
To complete the proof, we need to prove that m∗ is a NE of the game induced by the mechanism.
For that matter, it is enough to show that, for every i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
Vi
([
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)]
, ti(m
∗)
)
≥ Vi



int


∑N
k=1
k 6=i
n∗k + ni
N



 , ti(m∗−i,mi)


∀ mi ∈M. (27)
Equation (11) along with Eqs. (25) and (26) imply ti(m∗) = Lℓi
[
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)]
. Furthermore,
positivity of (n∗i+1 − ni)2pii together with fact that Vi is decreasing in ti give that
Vi
(
ξ, Lℓiξ
)
≥ Vi
(
ξ, Lℓiξ + (n
∗
i+1 − ni)
2pii
)
∀ ξ, ξ ∈ Π.
Moreover, since Ψ is a Lindahl equilibrium, (C3) implies that the following holds for every
i, i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
Vi
(
Λℓ, LℓiΛ
ℓ
)
≥ Vi
(
ξ, Lℓi ξ
)
∀ξ ∈ Π, (28)
Consequently, the fact that ti(m∗) = Lℓi
[
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)]
along with (27) and (28) result in
Vi
([
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)]
, ti(m
∗)
)
= Vi
([
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)]
, Lℓi
[
int
(∑N
k=1 n
∗
k
N
)])
≥ Vi
(
ξ, Lℓiξ
)
≥ Vi
(
ξ, Lℓiξ + (n
∗
i+1 − ni)
2pii
)
∀ ξ, ξ ∈ Π
= Vi



int


∑N
j=1
j 6=i
n∗j + ni
N



 , ti(mi,m∗−i)

 ∀ mi ∈M.
Therefore m∗ is a NE of the game induced by the proposed mechanism.
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VI. RELATED WORK
The game form/mechanism we proposed and analyzed in this paper has, for any realization
(V1, V2, · · · , VN ,Q, W¯ ) ∈ VN ×Q×W , the following properties:
• (P1) It is budget-balanced at every NE of the induced game as well as off equilibrium.
• (P2) It is individually rational, i.e., every user voluntarily participates in the induced game.
• (P3) Every NE of the induced game results in a Lindahl equilibrium; thus, the allocations
corresponding to all NE are weakly Pareto optimal. Conversely, every Lindahl equilibrium
results in a NE of the game induced by the mechanism.
Our proposed game form/mechanism achieves all the above desirable properties without any
assumption about, concavity, differentiability, monotonicity or quasi-linearity of the users’ utility
functions (the only assumption made on the users’ utility functions is ((A5))).
The results presented in this paper are distinctly different from those currently existing in the
literature for the reasons we explain below.
Most of previous work within the context of competitive power allocation games has investigated
Gaussian interference games ([15], [2]), that is, situations where the users operate in a Gaussian
noise environment. In a Gaussian interference game, every user can spread a fixed amount of
power arbitrarily across a continuous bandwidth, and attempts to maximize its total rate over all
possible power allocation strategies. In [15], the authors proved the existence and uniqueness
of a NE for a two-player version of the game, and provided an iterative water-filling algorithm
to obtain the NE. This work was extended in [2], where it was shown that the aforementioned
pure NE can be quite inefficient, but by playing an infinitely repeated game system performance
can be improved. Our results are different from those in [15], [2] because : (i) The users are
allowed to transmit at a discrete set of frequencies, and the power allocated at each frequency
most be chosen from a discrete set. (ii) The unique pure NE of the one-stage game in [15], [2]
does not necessarily result in a weakly Pareto optimal allocations. (iii) Most of the NE of the
repeated game in [2] result in allocations that are not weakly Pareto optimal.
In [6], the authors presented a market-based model for situations where every user can only
use one or more than one frequency bands, and the game induced by their proposed game form
is super modular. They developed/presented a distributed best response algorithm that converges
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to a NE. However, in general the Nash equilibria of the game induced by their mechanism are
not efficient, that is, they do not always result in optimal centralized power allocations, or weakly
Pareto optimal allocations.
In [9] the authors investigated the case where all users have the same utility function and each
user can only use one frequency band. They proved the existence of a NE in the game resulting
from the above assumptions. The NE is, in general, not efficient. The results in [9] critically
depend on the fact that the users’ utilities are identical and monotonic; these constraints are not
present in our model.
The game form/mechanism we have proposed/analyzed in this paper is in the category of the
mechanisms that economists created for public good problems [16], [7], [4], but it is distinctly
different form all of them because the allocation spaces F and Q in our formulation are discrete.
To the best of our knowledge, the game form we presented in this paper is the first mechanism
for power allocation and spectrum sharing in multi-user, multi-channel systems with strategic
users that achieves all three desirable properties (P1)-(P3). Furthermore, we do not impose any
assumption about, concavity, differentiability, monotonicity or quasi-linearity of the users utility
functions.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have discovered a game form for power allocation and spectrum sharing in multi-user,
multi-channel systems with strategic users that possesses several desirable properties. We have
performed an equilibrium analysis of the game form. Currently we do not have an algorithm
(tatonnement process) for the computation of the Nash equilibria of the mechanism. The dis-
covery of such an algorithm is an important open problem. In this paper we have investigated
a static allocation problem with strategic users. The discovery of mechanisms for the dynamic
analogue of the problem presented in this paper is an important open problem.
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